The European Rationalist – In Reason We Trust

Rationalism as a philosophy is defined as using reason and logic as the reliable basis for testing any claims of truth, seeking objective knowledge about reality, making judgments and drawing conclusions about it. Although rationalism must ultimately rely on sense perceptions, but it must also couple sense perceptions with logic and evidence. To be consistent with logic, the thought process of a rationalist must be free from logical fallacies, catalogued in many introductory books on logic or critical thinking. There is no place for personal bias or emotion in rationalism, although emotion and rationalism are not mutually exclusive, each has its place. More on this later.

Freethinking, which is sometimes confused with rationalism, is defined as the free forming of views about reality independent of authority or dogma, be it from a divine or human source. If we stick to the strict definitions, then freethinking is not synonymous with rationalism. One need not be strictly rational to be a freethinker. One is allowed the leeway to believe or form any opinion, not necessarily rational (essentially “think as you like”), as long as it is not influenced by existing religious, cultural or traditional dogma or authority. A postmodernist (Read intellectual anarchist) may claim to be a freethinker according to this non-restrictive definition. But rationalism is much more restrictive. It enforces logic and evidence as the guiding principle in thinking and forming opinions and cognition.

So although rationalism invariably leads to freethinking, but freethinking does not necessarily imply rationalism, since freethinking may include irrational views, beliefs and personal bias. I have attempted to provide my own definitions in a precise way in a recent post (Faith Philosophy and Dogma) to help set the criteria for freethinkers/freethinking.

I must point out that I have tried to define and explain rationalism in the sense it is commonly understood today. I have not tried to approach the concept of rationalism from the perspective of the history of philosophy. In philosophical literature rationalism have been historically used to mean a certain epistemological school. The epistemic rationalism of Des Cartes, Spinozza, Wolff, Leibnitz et alia postulated that human knowledge is attainable apriori through intellect alone, independent of senses. To them the true source of knowledge were innate ideas. Sense perception to them was a poor or incomplete source of knowledge. Rationalism was in contrast with empiricism, whose principal proponents were Locke, Hume, Berkeley et alia. But my definition of rationalism is, in my view more meaningful, pragmatic and consistent with contemporary scientific thinking.

Rationalism as a philosophy demands some strict mental discipline that many find hard to implement in their thoughts and actions. Many may not even be aware that they are not being strictly rational. The reason for this is that some mistakenly associate rationalism with certain ideals and outlook that do not necessarily follow from rationalism. Rationalism as a philosophy inevitably leads to scientific method through logic and critical thinking. Therefore a rationalist cannot subscribe a priori to any ideology, political or ideological, nor can a rationalist make statement of truth that is not a strict proposition.

So a rationalist cannot claim to be a strict atheist, i.e cannot assert that “God does not exist”, since God is not a logically well-defined and meaningful concept, all definitions of God in any religious context runs into contradictions and logical inconsistency. So the existence or non-existence of God are both logically meaningless to a rationalist. A rationalist can only take a noncognitivist position in the God context. For more details on this issue please carefully review the following two articles at :

1. http://web.archive.org/web/20080202191437/http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/definition.html
and
2. http://web.archive.org/web/20080202191437/http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/incompatible.html

Does it mean a rationalist cannot have any opinion at all about anything? Of course not. If an opinion does not contradict logic, evidence or observation, rationalism does not prevent one from forming a tentative opinion. For example it is not against rationalism to hypothesize about all the POSSIBLE causes of a crime, when definite evidence is missing to point to the actual cause. Same can be said about theories to explain certain facts of reality. That’s what science is about. Scientific speculation is just that. Theories are just possible explanation about facts and observations. Before theories can become laws they are just scientific opinions. But the important point to realize is that rationalist opinions, although not yet proven, should nevertheless be consistent with logic or observations (i.e does not contradict logic or observations) and should not use ill-defined terms.

Rationalism cannot be a basis for subscribing to a political party based on any dogma, or to express an a priori affiliation or support for a non-dogma based political party.. One can certainly do so as a human out of emotional need or bias, but not DUE TO rationalism. For a rationalist who chooses to be guided by pure rationalism, not emotion, support for a non-dogma based political party should be based on policies, performance, efficiencies and other objective criterion, thus need not be a static one, but changeable based on an ongoing assessment of the fulfillment of those criteria. There is no such concept as party loyalty in a rationalist vocabulary. Some intellectuals believe that certain political stand in an ideological, social or political controversy is required by rationalism, e.g leftist ideology, pro-choice stand in abortion, nurturist stand in nature-nurture debate, etc to name a few. Many of them commit the fallacy of appeal to emotion (invoking patriotism/nationalism) to justify an uncritical adoption of one side of a political issue.

To a rationalist, an apriori biased stand is not consistent with rationalism. They should be prepared to accept whichever viewpoint that scientific and logical reasoning may lead to, even if that goes against the popular trend of thinking. Rationalism is ruthless, it does not need to pamper to one’s emotional need or wishes, or care about political correctness..

In personal life, that means a rationalist has to acknowledge and be critical of the unpleasant facts, if necessary, about one’s near and dear ones, if evidence so suggests. Being able to separate facts from personal biases is an essential hallmark of rationalism. By the same token, a rationalist has to acknowledge, and criticize , if need be, the shortcomings of the race, religion or language he/she belongs to, in a detached way, free from personal bias, as well as acknowledge the superiority of another race, religion in a certain aspect, if objective evidence suggests so. Rationalism also does not imply making an a priori assumption that all bad or wrongs are equal, just because political correctness says so. Rationalism demands doing the required homework to quantify and recognize shades in right and wrong in morality and shades of good and bad in attributes by some objective criteria when applicable. This requires intellectual courage and integrity, as it can be potentially incur one the scorn of the majority, for whom the priority is loyalty, pride, patriotism etc. But rationalism does not recognize such mental constructs or sets such priority. It only cares for logic and evidence.

Rationalism does not allow taking a stand just because it is politically correct or popular. Many intellectuals associate the terms liberal, progressive etc with rationalism/freethinking. But liberal, progressive etc are usually understood and judged in the context of which stand one takes vis a vis certain issues, e.g pro-choice in abortion, leftist ideology ij politics, nurturist stand in the nature/nurture debate, a puritanic belief that all bads are equal (i.e cultural and moral relativism) etc. But rationalism does not require one to adopt such positions, and in fact in certain issues,\ may lead to the opposite stand by scientific evidence and logic. I will not dwell at length on the specifics of those scientific evidences in all such cases as it is a topic on its own and I am only interested on the general aspects of rationalism in this essay. A small example may help to illustrate rationalistic approach to an issue. IF we adopt the axiom that ending a “life” is morally wrong, THEN the act of abortion by definition will be morally wrong, since biology tells us that a fetus has life of its own. There is no value judgement involved, that was a conclusion derived from purely logical inference. (Notice the IF.. THEN.. construct). Whether we should adopt “ending life is morally wrong” as an axiom of course is not dictated by rationalism. But in fact we can derive that axiom from rationalism if we adopt another axiom as more fundamental, for example the axiom that we should do whatever is needed to increases the odds for the survival of human species. In that case rational thinking using evolutionary biology tells us that IF we adopt the precept “ending life is morally wrong”, THEN it increases the odds for the survival of human species (Again notice the IF.. THEN.. contruct). Whether we should consider “increasing the odds of the survival of human species” as a moral imperative is of course beyond rationalism. This is an intuitive moral axiom. This example clearly shows that rationalism does have a role in formulating moral precpets, barring the mosr primitive moral axioms. Even humanism, is not strictly derived from rationalism. Humanism follows from rationalism if the postulate “we should put priority on the welfare of maximum number of humans irrespective of race, color, creed, ethnicity etc.” is added to rationalism. It must be noted that all religions and dogmas claim human welfare as their goal as well. But what differentiates their view of humanism from rational humanism is that for them, that goal is claimed to be achievable only through the implementation of their dogma. So dogma comes first for them. Not only that, the priority for welfare in most religions and dogmas is reserved for their followers. But rational humanism does not make that distinction. Once humanism is arrived through rationalism, the notions of democracy and secularism follows as corollary.

Symbolically: 
Rationalism+Human good-> Humanism-> Democracy->Secularism

Another point that many may have already wondered is that how can we decide who is rationalist or not? After all, followers of all religion or dogma claim they believe in logic and reason. Doesn’t every one have their own logic and every religion their own logic? So how can one not be rational? This is a tricky question that can lead to a slippery slope if not clarified beforehand. Cultural and moral relativists, postmodernists exploit such slippery slope to argue that all are equal, nothing is more valid than another etc. The logic and evidence referred to in rationalism, is shared by humanity with an overwhelming consensus crossing race, religion and affiliation etc. In other words they are universal. Modern logic finds much in common with the logic of early Greek, Hindu and Buddhist philosophers, as well as the early Muslim rationalists (Mutazillites) during the time of the House of Wisdom in Bagdad. This logic has been perfected and improved by later philosophers, like Locke, Hume, Kant and many Mathematicians and logicians of the twentieth century. This is the logic that is taught with tax payer’s funding in public schools in most nations of the world as well as secular private schools. This is also the logic that has WORKED. This logic has been the basis of the scientific method that has been so successful, has changed the world, made predictions about nature that was tested and verified to be true. It is also leading humanity towards continued advancement. It is no surprise that this is the logic that people have staked their money in teaching and learning. There are a set of unambiguous rules for valid logical reasoning, both informal and formal taught in elementary logic class that can act as guide to resolve dilemmas, ambiguities, paradox. contradictions, disputes etc. Also it is important to note that claims must be backed up by not just logic, but evidence and objectivity as well, both of are lacking in claims of religious or other dogmas. Contrast that with the “logic” that person “A” uses to rationalize his own belief, or the “logic” of religion “X” to rationalize that religion. Such “logic” is not shared universally, nor has it demonstrated its utility by coming up with any predictions, inventions or innovations, nor to the discovery of any fundamental truth about nature or reality. A “logic” that has been invented as a dedicated ploy to justify one dogma or belief is no logic at all. Besides such logic does not have universal appeal.

It should suffice to note that a dogma by definition is not based on logic and evidence, so to try to justify a dogma by logic is a fallacy to begin with and thus contrary to rationalism. It is quite intriguing to see vocal champions of religious dogmas even among some PhD’s of reputed universities, who are not ashamed to claim that their belief is supported by logic and evidence!

Rationalism also implies skepticism. Skepticism requires one to doubt any claim to truth, unless proven by evidence and logic, and to suspend belief or judgment in absence thereof, which clearly follows from rationalism. In personal life, such skepticism forces one to refrain from forming judgement or drawing hasty conclusions or opinion about a person or any claim of truth. In the absence of any evidence or logic a skeptic should stay in a “do nothing” i.e neutral mode. This “do nothing” neutral mode is a level most minds cannot recognize and needs some effort to become at ease with it. Most feel tempted to ruch to an opinion one way or the other, even in the absence of any supporting data. If and when the evidence or logic is available only then a skeptic can form an opinion, that is dictated by the evidence and logic, not by their wishful desires or biases.

A rationalist has to have the intellectual courage to acknowledge unpleasant truths. A rationalist never gained/gains materially or otherwise by being rational. It is just a philosophy that they find intuitively appealing.

Let me now turn to some mistaken notions about rationalism that is quite common among many. Many think that rationalism means an arrogant claim to infallibility, that rationalism never admits of ever being wrong, that it denies the possibility that logic itself may be wrong! All these are due to a lack of careful reflection. First that one could be wrong is a trivial and self-evident fact. It is like saying that one cannot be sure that he/she will make it to the destination as the flight may crash. ACKNOWLEDGING that fact of the limits and uncertainties in one’s knowledge is a matter of humility. Humility is a personality trait.  

Rationalism is a philosophy, not a trait. Rationalism does not prevent one, nor does it mandate one to possess certain personality trait. Second to say that “logic” itself may be wrong is to commit a fallacy. Because to judge something as “wrong” needs a logic of its own. One cannot use logic to judge the same logic as wrong! We have assumed that there exists only one system of logic that works best. Until we find a better system of logic, it is a fallacy to judge that logic as wrong. But saying that the “logic” is not wrong does not mean saying that one cannot make mistakes. Mistakes are due to an individual’s limit or flaw in applying logic, not due to logic itself. But there is no better way to overcome that limit than logic itself. Anyway, that humility of admitting the self-evident fact of fallibility is built in the scientific method.  

Scientific method, which is derived from rationalism is based on the premise that there is no absolute or final truth, and that any conclusion about reality is always tentative, subject to continual revision in light of further evidence. But one must not conclude that just because in certain instance one could predict the truth correctly by non-rational (intuition, guess) means that means intuition is superior to rationalism as a means for seeking truth. For example if a coin is tossed, an intuitionist may intuitively guess that the coin will come heads up. A rationalist cannot predict the outcome on the basis of logic and science (It is incredibly complex calculation) If the coin does fall heads up, does it prove that intuition is superior to rationalism? Of course not. Let me now clarify what rationalism is not or cannot It is a mistaken to believe that rationalism can solve all problems in life, or prevent them. It cannot. The fact it cannot is because the truth in many situation in life is not always known in advance for one to make the right decision. Rationalism is limited by the knowledge or truth that is needed in making an informed decision to solve or prevent a problem. In an indeterminstic situation intuitive guesses and judgement is inevitable. And the intuition of rational person is not guaranteed to be right. So in those situations in life where there are unknowns and uncertainties, intuitive guesswork cannot be avoided. Rationalism may offer some guidelines in making the best guesses, but it cannot offer a guarantee for success. For example, rationalism cannot guarantee one will make the right choice in marriage or relationship. Rationalism cannot prevent one from making mistakes in life. Gamble in life cannot be totally averted through rationalism. Risk cannot be either. More generally speaking, from an utilitarian point of view, rationalism is no guarantee to material success in individual life. Rationalism is a principle based on logic and evidence. In an imperfect world, that is not always the sure route to material success. Just like honesty is not. But the value of rationalism goes beyond personal gains or interests. It’s value lies in the collective imnprovement of the quality of human life by following rationalistic approach. COnsider the cost human society has paid and is paying in terms of dollars and man hours for believing in dogmas and faiths that have no logic or evodence as its basis. How much time and resources are being spent towards relgiouis rituals, how much suffering and persecution has enforcement of some cruelst relgious dogmas brought to many decent humans? If majority of a society adopt rationalism as their personal philosophy, then such wastage and social evils could be abolished or minimized. Society would prosper faster then. A common thinking is that morality is beyond rationalism. I think that is a mistaken view. Although the moral axioms at the bottom of a moral system may have to be assumed arbitrarily based on intuition, once the axioms are accepted, further moral precepts based on those axioms can certainly be rationally analyzed or developed. Rationalism is the product of human mind. So is morality. There is no apriori cause for them to be not connected. In the ultimate analysis since it is the laws of nature that has created human brain and thus rationalism, so it should be in principle possible to formulate a moral system based on the same laws of nature via rationalism. It may have to be an evolutionary process.

It must also be emphasized that not all human brains are equally capabale of rationalism or programmed for rational thinking. There is no guaranatee that rationalism can be inculcated by preaching or training. Human brain, being inherently complex, have varying degrees of potential for each type of thinking. It is possible certain brains are more susceptible to certain cues that triggers rational thinking, while others are impervious to any cues. There are some PhD’s of renouned universties, even after being exposed to some of the finest rationalistic arguments, writings and philosophical essays, continue to defend religious dogmas, sometimes even using the very same rationalistic arguments and languages they read about! They are impervious to any rational cues at all. Majority of humans are easily susceptible to cues of dogmatist preaching or rationalist thinking. They are up for grabs, so to speak. These are the fence-sitters, swing voters in the rationalism vs. dogmatism election, metaphorically speaking. It does not make much sense to say “thou shalt be rational”. The best that those who value and cherish rationalism can do is to target this majority, present to them examples of rational arguments to refute or critique issues, debunk the claims of mystics, godmen and other charlartans by logical means and evidence. This can be through electronic and print media, or preferably if possible through practical workshops as has been done in many rural outbacks of India. I also strongly suggest that rationalism be included in high school curricula. While it may be unrealistic to expect this to happen in the current environment in many countries where religious sentiments run high, specially if rationalism is pitted against the popular religion, it may be acceptable including rationalism as a general philosophy to emphasize reason and evidence over blind faith and superstition. Leading educators and academicians need to take the lead in lobbying with the relevant authorites for such curricular changes.

Next, to many, rationalism means robbing one of the sense of beauty, romanticism, love, compassion , i.e leaves one heartless and devoid of emotions. This is a big myth. Rationalism stresses separating the head from the heart, not REPLACING heart with head. Certain things are intrinsically rooted in instinct, and thus beyond rationalism. Love, fear, altruism, conscience (sense of right and wrong), these are biologically rooted instincts. Instincts are not controllable or influenced by rationalism. Instincts are more or less hardwired in our genes and manifested through the workings of the limbic system of our brain. Whereas rationalism results from the thought process determined by the evolution of cerebral cortex. Humans posses both these brain components. So a rational person can feel an instinctive fear in certain environment, or can feel passionate love for certain person. What differentiates a rational person from a less or rational or emotional person is the synaptic connectivities in their cerebral cortex, not in their limbic system. So when it comes to primal instincts controlled by limbic systems, for example self-preservation, the difference disappears. In a life threatening situation, control is automatically taken over by the limbic system from the cerebral cortex, biological instinct of aggression may kick in, and at that point whatever one does is not subject to rationalism anymore. Taste is also instinctive. Rationalism has nothing to do with it.

Although rationalism does not decide or control our tastes and emotions, it can however EXPLAIN (or at least try to through scientific method) the basis of such emotions and likes or dislikes. Rationalism cannot affect or control love. But rationalism can certainly help explain the biological (in both evolutionary and biochemical terms) origin of love, morality and other human values and attributes. The same can be said about all other instincts and emotions. A good example of that would be the book “Why we feel : The Science of Emotions” by Victor Johnston. So being rational does not by any means deprive of those instincts, tastes and emotions, because they are an integral part of being human, rational or not. Rationalism enables humans to understand and explain the underlyinmg basis of emotions, it does not rob us of the emotions. A neurologist does not lose his mind(brain) in trying to understand the workings of the brain, nor does an evolutionary biologist ceases to be a loving mate or parent in trying to explain and understand the biological roots of love, simply because we have no control on our biological instincts, whether we are rational or not. Rationalism however can however help to control the impulses that emotions may lead to. In biological language, although the generation of emotions in the limbic system itself cannot be controlled, the impulsive ACTS (e.g aggression) that those emotions often lead to can be controlled by the feedback mechanism of the cerebral cortex over the limbic system.
Another “reason” for viewing rationalism with cynical eyes by many is because it is believed by them that humanitarian acts should come from an emotional impulse, not from a rationalization process, which does not take the compassion factor in the decision of such acts. On first look, it may look like a noble view, putting heart before head. But as I pointed out, compassion, humanitarian acts all are derived from altruism, a biologically rooted instinct, so rationalism cannot affect it. Although rationalism can certainly manage altruistic instinct in a way that ensures optimum utilization of it. Impulsive altruistic acts do not always lead to the best results. Rationalism can help to channelize our altruistic instincts in the most optimal manner. At a very personal level, of course even a rationalist can (and often does) act out of an impulse and do an act of humanitarianism or compassion, since doing so is not contradicted by logic. Compassion should not REPLACE rationalism, but must be accompanied by it. A good example would be the case of a judge granting leniency to convicted on compassionate grounds. But the compassion follows only after a thorough rational analysis of the crimes committed by the convicted. Rationalism is truly applicable in forming opinions, judgments, learning the truth and solving problems, but not to instincts, or impulses that are non-judgmental, non-intrusive and innocuous

Another “reason” for viewing rationalism with cynical eyes by many is because it is believed by them that humanitarian acts should come from an emotional impulse, not from a rationalization process, which does not take the compassion factor in the decision of such acts. On first look, it may look like a noble view, putting heart before head. But as I pointed out, compassion, humanitarian acts all are derived from altruism, a biologically rooted instinct, so rationalism cannot affect it. Although rationalism can certainly manage altruistic instinct in a way that ensures optimum utilization of it. Impulsive altruistic acts do not always lead to the best results. Rationalism can help to channelize our altruistic instincts in the most optimal manner. At a very personal level, of course even a rationalist can (and often does) act out of an impulse and do an act of humanitarianism or compassion, since doing so is not contradicted by logic. Compassion should not REPLACE rationalism, but must be accompanied by it. A good example would be the case of a judge granting leniency to convicted on compassionate grounds. But the compassion follows only after a thorough rational analysis of the crimes committed by the convicted. Rationalism is truly applicable in forming opinions, judgments, learning the truth and solving problems, but not to instincts, or impulses that are non-judgmental, non-intrusive and innocuousLastly I will be remiss if I do not point out the challenge that rationalism is facing from the postmodernist thinking that seems to be gaining ground in recent years. Postmodernists are challenging that very golden product of rationalism, namely scientific method by insisting that scientific method is just one among many EQUALLY valid route to truth and deserves no special privileged status. This is nothing but intellectual anarchism. Postmodernists are nothing but armchair social scientists that have fallen much behind modern scientific paradigms and are threatened by the scientific approach that the social sciences are adopting (rather being forced to adopt). They are watching with frustration one after another social discipline is losing ground to the exact sciences. Not being able to face upto the challenge of the sciences some of them have chosen the treacherous art of deconstruction and misapplying it to scientific method. So rationalism now faces challenges from two fronts, religious dogma (which Europeans successfully faced during the renaissance), and postmodernism, which is a new challenge that needs to be faced. So the need to emphasize rationalism is more now than ever. Hopefully my fellow Mukto-Monas will share my passion for rationalism.

Aparthib Zaman, aparthib@yahoo.com

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This article on Theism, Atheism, and Rationality  is by Alvin Plantinga  

A theological objections to the belief that there is such a person as God come in many varieties. There are, for example, the familiar objections that theism is somehow incoherent, that it is inconsistent with the existence of evil, that it is a hypothesis ill-confirmed or maybe even disconfirmed by the evidence, that modern science has somehow cast doubt upon it, and the like. Another sort of objector claims, not that theism is incoherent or false or probably false (after all, there is precious little by way of cogent argument for that conclusion) but that it is in some way unreasonable or irrational to believe in God, even if that belief should happen to be true. Here we have, as a centerpiece, the evidentialist objection to theistic belief. The claim is that none of the theistic arguments-deductive, inductive, or abductive-is successful; hence there is at best insufficient evidence for the existence of God. But then the belief that there is such a person as God is in some way intellectually improper-somehow foolish or irrational. A person who believed without evidence that there are an even number of ducks would be believing foolishly or irrationally; the same goes for the person who believes in God without evidence. On this view, one who accepts belief in God but has no evidence for that belief is not, intellectually speaking, up to snuff. Among those who have offered this objection are Antony Flew, Brand Blanshard, and Michael Scriven. Perhaps more important is the enormous oral tradition: one finds this objection to theism bruited about on nearly any major university campus in the land.

The objection in question has also been endorsed by Bertrand Russell, who was once asked what he would say if, after dying, he were brought into the presence of God and asked whyhe had not been a believer. Russell’s reply: “I’d say, ‘Not enough evidence, God! Not enough evidence!’” I’m not sure just how that reply would be received; but my point is only that Russell, like many others, has endorsed this evidentialist objection to theistic belief. Now what, precisely, is the objector’s claim here? He holds that the theist without evidence is irrational or unreasonable; what is the property with which he is crediting such a theist when he thus describes him? What, exactly, or even approximately, does he mean when he says that the theist without evidence is irrational? Just what, as he sees it, is the problem with such a theist? The objection can be seen as taking at least two forms; and there are at least two corresponding senses or conceptions of rationality lurking in the nearby bushes. According to the first, a theist who has no evidence has violated an intellectual or cognitive duty of some sort. He has gone contrary to an obligation laid upon him-perhaps by society, or perhaps by his own nature as a creature capable of grasping propositions and holding beliefs. There is an obligation or something like an obligation to proportion one’s beliefs to the strength of the evidence. Thus according to John Locke, a mark of a rational person is “the not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance than the proof it is built upon will warrant,” and according to David Hume, “A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence.” 

In the nineteenth century we have W.K. Clifford, that “delicious enfant terrible” as William James called him, insisting that it is monstrous, immoral, and perhaps even impolite to accept a belief for which you have insufficient evidence:
 

Whoso would deserve well of his fellow in this matter will guard the purity of his belief with a very fanaticism of jealous care, lest at any time it should rest on an unworthy object, and catch a stain which can never be wiped away.[1] He adds that if a belief has been accepted on insufficient evidence, the pleasure is a stolen one. Not only does it deceive ourselves by giving us a sense of power which we do not really possess, but it is sinful, stolen in defiance of our duty to mankind. That duty is to guard ourselves from such beliefs as from a pestilence, which may shortly master our body and spread to the rest of the town. [2]
 
And finally: To sum up: it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.[3] (It is not hard to detect, in these quotations, the “tone of robustious pathos” with which James credits Clifford.) On this view theists without evidence-my sainted grandmother, for example-are flouting their epistemic duties and deserve our disapprobation and disapproval. Mother Teresa, for example, if she has not arguments for her belief in God, then stands revealed as a sort of intellectual libertine-someone who has gone contrary to her intellectual obligations and is deserving of reproof and perhaps even disciplinary action. Now the idea that there are intellectual duties or obligations is difficult but not implausible, and I do not mean to question it here. It is less plausible, however, to suggest that I would or could be going contrary to my intellectual duties in believing, without evidence, that there is such a person as God. For first, my beliefs are not, for the most part, within my control. If, for example, you offer me $1,000,000 to cease believing that Mars is smaller than Venus, there is no way I can collect. But the same holds for my belief in God: even if I wanted to, I couldn’t-short of heroic measures like coma inducing drugs-just divest myself of it. (At any rate there is nothing I can do directly; perhaps there is a sort of regimen that if followed religiously would issue, in the long run, in my no longer accepting belief in God.) But secondly, there seems no reason to think that I have such an obligation. Clearly I am not under an obligation to have evidence for everything I believe; that would not be possible. But why, then, suppose that I have an obligation to accept belief in God only if I accept other propositions which serve as evidence for it? This is by no means self-evident or just obvious, and it is extremely hard to see how to find a cogent argument for it.

In any event, I think the evidentialist objector can take a more promising line. He can hold, not that the theist without evidence has violated some epistemic duty-after all, perhaps he can’t help himself- but that he is somehow intellectually flawed or disfigured. Consider someone who believes that Venus is smaller than Mercury-not because he has evidence, but because he read it in a comic book and always believes whatever he reads in comic books-or consider someone who holds that belief on the basis of an outrageously bad argument. Perhaps there is no obligation he has failed to meet; nevertheless his intellectual condition is defective in some way. He displays a sort of deficiency, a flaw, an intellectual dysfunction of some sort. Perhaps he is like someone who has an astigmatism, or is unduly clumsy, or suffers from arthritis. And perhaps the evidentialist objection is to be construed, not as the claim that the theist without evidence has violated some intellectual obligations, but that he suffers from a certain sort of intellectual deficiency. The theist without evidence, we might say, is an intellectual gimp. Alternatively but similarly, the idea might be that the theist without evidence is under a sort of illusion, a kind of pervasive illusion afflicting the great bulk of mankind over the great bulk of the time thus far allotted to it. Thus Freud saw religious belief as “illusions, fulfillments of the oldest, strongest, and most insistent wishes of mankind.”[4 ]He sees theistic belief as a matter of wish-fulfillment. Men are paralyzed by and appalled at the spectacle of the overwhelming, impersonal forces that control our destiny, but mindlessly take no notice, no account of us and our needs and desires; they therefore invent a heavenly father of cosmic proportions, who exceeds our earthly fathers in goodness and love as much as in power. Religion, says Freud, is the “universal obsessional neurosis of humanity”, and it is destined to disappear when human beings learn to face reality as it is, resisting the tendency to edit it to suit our fancies. A similar sentiment is offered by Karl Marx: Religion . . . is the self-consciousness and the self-feeling of the man who has either not yet found himself, or else (having found himself) has lost himself once more. But man is not an abstract being . . . Man is the world of men, the State, society. This State, this society, produce religion, produce a perverted world consciousness, because they are a perverted world . . . Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the feelings of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of unspiritual conditions. It is the opium of the people.

The people cannot be really happy until it has been deprived of illusory happiness by the abolition of religion. The demand that the people should shake itself free of illusion as to its own condition is the demand that it should abandon a condition which needs illusion.[5] Note that Marx speaks here of a perverted world consciousness produced by a perverted world. This is a perversion from a correct, or right, or natural condition, brought about somehow by an unhealthy and perverted social order. From the Marx-Freud point of view, the theist is subject to a sort of cognitive dysfunction, a certain lack of cognitive and emotional health. We could put this as follows: the theist believes as he does only because of the power of this illusion, this perverted neurotic condition. He is insane, in the etymological sense of that term; he is unhealthy. His cognitive equipment, we might say, isn’t working properly; it isn’t functioning as it ought to. If his cognitive equipment were working properly, working the way it ought to work, he wouldn’t be under the spell of this illusion. He would instead face the world and our place in it with the clear-eyed apprehension that we are alone in it, and that any comfort and help we get will have to be our own devising. There is no Father in heaven to turn to, and no prospect of anything, after death, but dissolution. (”When we die, we rot,” says Michael Scriven, in one of his more memorable lines.) Now of course the theist is likely to display less than overwhelming enthusiasm about the idea that he is suffering from a cognitive deficiency, is under a sort of widespread illusion endemic to the human condition. It is at most a liberal theologian or two, intent on novelty and eager to concede as much as possible to contemporary secularity, who would embrace such an idea. The theist doesn’t see himself as suffering from cognitive deficiency. As a matter of fact, he may be inclined to see the shoe as on the other foot; he may be inclined to think of the atheist as the person who is suffering, in this way, from some illusion, from some noetic defect, from an unhappy, unfortunate, and unnatural condition with deplorable noetic consequences. He will see the atheist as somehow the victim of sin in the world- his own sin or the sin of others. According to the book of Romans, unbelief is a result of sin; it originates in an effort to “suppress the truth in unrighteousness.” According to John Calvin, God has created us with a nisus or tendency to see His hand in the world around us; a “sense of deity,” he says, “is inscribed in the hearts of all.” He goes on: Indeed, the perversity of the impious, who though they struggle furiously are unable to extricate themselves from the fear of God, is abundant testimony that his conviction, namely, that there is some God, is naturally inborn in all, and is fixed deep within, as it were in the very marrow. . . . From this we conclude that it is not a doctrine that must first be learned in school, but one of which each of us is master from his mother’s womb and which nature itself permits no man to forget.[6]

Were it not for the existence of sin in the world, says Calvin, human beings would believe in God to the same degree and with the same natural spontaneity displayed in our belief in the existence of other persons, or an external world, or the past. This is the natural human condition; it is because of our presently unnatural sinful condition that many of us find belief in God difficult or absurd. The fact is, Calvin thinks, one who does not believe in God is in an epistemically defective position-rather like someone who does not believe that his wife exists, or thinks that she is a cleverly constructed robot that has no thoughts, feelings, or consciousness. Thus the believer reverses Freud and Marx, claiming that what they see as sickness is really health and what they see as health is really sickness. Obviously enough, the dispute here is ultimately ontological, or theological, or metaphysical; here we see the ontological and ultimately religious roots of epistemological discussions of rationality. What you take to be rational, at least in the sense in question, depends upon your metaphysical and religious stance. It depends upon your philosophical anthropology.

 Your view as to what sort of creature a human being is will determine, in whole or in part, your views as to what is rational or irrational for human beings to believe; this view will determine what you take to be natural, or normal, or healthy, with respect to belief. So the dispute as to who is rational and who is irrational here can’t be settled just by attending to epistemological considerations; it is fundamentally not an epistemological dispute, but an ontological or theological dispute. How can we tell what it is healthy for human beings to believe unless we know or have some idea about what sort of creature a human being is? If you think he is created by God in the image of God, and created with a natural tendency to see God’s hand in the world about us, a natural tendency to recognize that he has been created and is beholden to his creator, owing his worship and allegiance, then of course you will not think of belief in God as a manifestation of wishful thinking or as any kind of defect at all. It is then much more like sense perception or memory, though in some ways much more important. On the other hand, if you think of a human being as the product of blind evolutionary forces, if you think there is no God and that human beings are part of a godless universe, then you will be inclined to accept a view according to which belief in God is a sort of disease or dysfunction, due perhaps, to a sort of softening of the brain.

So the dispute as to who is healthy and who diseased has ontological or theological roots, and is finally to be settled, if at all at that level. And here I would like to present a consideration that, I think tells in favor of the theistic way of looking at the matter. As I have been representing that matter, theist and atheist alike speak of a sort of dysfunction, of cognitive faculties or cognitive equipment not working properly, of their not working as they ought to. But how are we to understand that? What is it for something to work properly? Isn’t there something deeply problematic about the idea of proper functioning? What is it for my cognitive faculties to be working properly? What is it for a natural organism-a tree, for example-to be in good working order, to be functioning properly? Isn’t working properly relative to our aims and interests? A cow is functioning properly when she gives milk; a garden patch is as it ought to be when it displays a luxuriant preponderance of the sorts of vegetation we propose to promote. But then it seems patent that what constitutes proper functioning depends upon our aims and interests. So far as nature herself goes, isn’t a fish decomposing in a hill of corn functioning just as properly, just as excellently, as one happily swimming about chasing minnows? But then what could be meant by speaking of “proper functioning” with respect to our cognitive faculties? A chunk of reality-an organism, a part of an organism, an ecosystem, a garden patch-”functions properly” only with respect to a sort of grid we impose on nature-a grid that incorporates our aims and desires. But from a theistic point of view, the idea of proper functioning, as applied to us and our cognitive equipment, is not more problematic than, say, that of a Boeing 747’s working properly. Something we have constructed-a heating system, a rope, a linear accelerator-is functioning properly when it is functioning in the way it was designed to function. My car works properly if it works the way it was designed to work. My refrigerator is working properly if it refrigerates, if it does what a refrigerator is designed to do.

This, I think, is the root idea of working properly. But according to theism, human beings, like ropes and linear accelerators, have been designed; they have been created and designed by God. Thus, he has an easy answer to the relevant set of questions: What is proper functioning? What is it for my cognitive faculties to be working properly? What is cognitive dysfunction? What is it to function naturally? My cognitive faculties are functioning naturally, when they are functioning in the way God designed them to function. On the other hand, if the atheological evidentialist objector claims that the theist without evidence is irrational, and if he goes on to construe irrationality in terms of defect or dysfunction, then he owes us an account of this notion. Why does he take it that the theist is somehow dysfunctional, at least in this area of his life?

More importantly, how does he conceive dysfunction? How does he see dysfunction and its opposite? How does he explain the idea of an organism’s working properly, or of some organic system or part of an organism’s thus working? What account does he give of it? Presumably he can’t see the proper functioning of my noetic equipment as its functioning in the way it was designed to function; so how can he put it? Two possibilities leap to mind. First, he may be thinking of proper functioning as functioning in a way that helps us attain our ends. In this way, he may say, we think of our bodies as functioning properly, as being healthy, when they function in the way we want them to, when they function in such a way as to enable us to do the sorts of things we want to do. But of course this will not be a promising line to take in the present context; for while perhaps the atheological objector would prefer to see our cognitive faculties function in such a way as not to produce belief in God in us, the same cannot be said, naturally enough, for the theist. Taken this way the atheological evidentialist’s objection comes to little more than the suggestion that the atheologician would prefer it if people did not believe in God without evidence. That would be an autobiographical remark on his part, having the interest such remarks usually have in philosophical contexts.  A second possibility: proper functioning and allied notions are to be explained in terms of aptness for promoting survival, either at an individual or species level.

There isn’t time to say much about this here; but it is at least and immediately evident that the atheological objector would then owe us an argument for the conclusion that belief in God is indeed less likely to contribute to our individual survival, or the survival of our species than is atheism or agnosticism. But how could such an argument go? Surely the prospects for a non-question begging argument of this sort are bleak indeed. For if theism-Christian theism, for example-is true, then it seems wholly implausible to think that widespread atheism, for example, would be more likely to contribute to the survival of our race than widespread theism.  By way of conclusion: a natural way to understand such notions as rationality and irrationality is in terms of the proper functioning of the relevant cognitive equipment. Seen from this perspective, the question whether it is rational to believe in God without the evidential support of other propositions is really a metaphysical or theological dispute. The theist has an easy time explaining the notion of our cognitive equipment’s functioning properly: our cognitive equipment functions properly when it functions in the way God designed it to function. The atheist evidential objector, however, owes us an account of this notion. What does he mean when he complains that the theist without evidence displays a cognitive defect of some sort? How does he understand the notion of cognitive malfunction?   

 

 

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NOTES   

[1]W.K. Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief,” in Lectures and Essays (London: Macmillan, 1879), p. 183.

[2]Ibid, p. 184.

[3]Ibid, p. 186.

[4]Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion (New York: Norton, 1961), p. 30.

[5]K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3: Introduction to a Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right, by Karl Marx (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975). 

[6]John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), 1.3 (p. 43- 44).

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